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DEFINING THE CHALLENGES OF
PROFESSIONALISM: ACCESS TO LAW AND
ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAWYERS
DEBORAH L. RHODE*
Perhaps the only downside of cosponsoring a conference with the
University of South Carolina School of Law Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough Center on Professionalism, particularly when it is their
generosity that makes it all possible, is that you are deeply indebted to
its superb director Roy Stuckey. And if he asks, you do things that you
would never otherwise dream of doing-like speaking after Dennis
Archer. But having been cajoled into that position, I follow the sage
organizing principle of vaudeville: never follow a magic act with
another magic act.
So let me not try to duplicate that inspirational call to action, but
instead raise a few sobering questions about what we are about, both
here and in much of our other work. A recent cartoon in the New
Yorker put out one possible version of that question. It features an
attorney peering into the firm's reception area and inquiring
plaintively, "Ms. Bumey, do we have anything on right and wrong?"'
Given that this is a conference on professionalism, I assume that our
files need no more of that. Rather, we are all here because we share a
basic commitment to the professionalism ideal and to the values of
personal integrity and public service that it implies. But there is also
much about professionalism rhetoric and the way it is invoked that
should give us pause.
Indeed, if memory serves, and it probably does because there is a
written record, I made a similar observation at the last conference on
professionalism that our centers jointly sponsored two years ago. As
I noted then,
A threshold question is whether we are all on
the same page, or even in the same book, with
respect to what we are trying to fix. I have long
argued that a central part of the "professionalism
problem" is a lack of consensus about what exactly
*Conference Co-Chair, Professor and Director of the Keck Center on Legal Ethics
and the Legal Profession, Stanford Law School.
1. 78 NEW YORKER 64 (2002).
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the problem is, let alone how best to address it.
"Professionalism" has become an all-purpose
prescription for a broad range of complaints,
including everything from tasteless courtroom
apparel to felonies like document destruction. For
some lawyers, the term evokes some hypothesized
happier era "just over the horizon of personal
experience," when law was less competitive and
commercial and more collegial and civil. For other
lawyers, the concept carries less appealing symbolic
freight. These nostalgic appeals seem like
opportunities for pompous platitudes and selective
recollection. After all, the good-old days were never
all that good for many lawyers who did not fit within
well-off white male circles, or for many clients who
bore the costs of anticompetitive bar practices.2
I went on to suggest that the challenge before us was to give some
greater content to the professionalism ideal and to learn more about
how best to promote it. Too much of our cottage industry of
professionalism initiatives-centers, conferences, commissions,
commentary, and codes-is never evaluated in any systematic way. The
impetus for much of this work is a shared sense that there is a problem
out there, and, as one bar leader put it, "We have to do something."3
But as I asked (I hope rhetorically) at our last conference, should we
not have a more "informed basis for deciding whether the 'something'
that we are doing is the most effective use of our time and
resources?"4 In particular, I identified two dimensions on which I
believed our strategies were falling short: access to justice and
accountability for professional regulation. I closed with the hope that
the Conference could help "remind us of our aspirations, and demand
that we do better." 5
In due course, these remarks were published as part of the
symposium proceedings in the South Carolina Law Review. And like
so much else on the subject, they quickly vanished into the void with
no discernable trace. The professionalism parade proceeds merrily on,
fueled by the comfortable but unsupported assumption that all of its
2. Deborah L. Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S. C. L. REV. 458,
459 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
3. Id. at 458 (quoting an unnamed participant at a meeting of the Consortium on
Professionalism at the American Bar Association, 2000).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 471.
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hoopla is doing good in the world. As one recent overview, again in
the South Carolina Law Review, happily concluded, recent judicial
initiatives "[s]lowly but surely ... [are] beginning to have an impact
on the way that American lawyers think about the reality of their
relationship to [professional values like] truth and honesty.",6 Would
that it were so, but we have no real evidence for it.
So too, the background materials for this Conference are filled
with fine intentions and noble aspirations. To cite just one example,
the Colorado Bar Association Professionalism Reform Initiative Task
Force wants schools to discuss the "corrosive effects of dishonesty"
and wants individual lawyers to "look inward, to examine their own
behaviors and to emphasize the spiritually liberating effects of honest
and truthful conduct on one's own life . . . ."' With all due respect, if
such calls to action were effective, we would not need professionalism
initiatives or symposia like this. Indeed, the recent spate of ethics
scandals should remind us of how wide the gap can be between
professionals' avowed principles and workplace practices. Enron, as
business ethicists have noted, "was long regarded as an exemplary
corporate citizen."8 And companies with model ethical codes and high
social responsibility ratings have often failed to institutionalize their
commitments.9 The kinds of ethical initiatives that make for good
public relations and splashy professionalism programs do not
necessarily translate into moral behavior if strong economic incentives
are pointing in the opposite direction.
Although that point should be obvious, it can too readily escape
the attention of those like us-educators and bar leaders-who have
more control over the aspirational agenda than the financial realities
of legal practice. I was reminded of that point last fall, when invited to
spend time with the Nebraska statejudges' professionalism committee.
It had a very small budget and a very large agenda. Apparently
unaware of my reputation for drizzling on professionalism parades, its
members were eager for my thoughts on where to begin with their
6. W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers:
Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Inititive, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527, 548
(2002).
7. COLO. BAR ASs'N PROFESSIONAL REFORM INITIATIVE TASK FORCE, INTERIM
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (May 2002), available at
http:www.cobar.org/group/index.cfm?category=288&EntitylD=upadm
8. David Vogel, Recycling Corporate Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
2002, at B2; see also Marjorie Kelly, The Next Step for CSR: Economic Democracy,
BUS. ETHICS, Aug., 2002, at 10 ("waxing nostalgic" over recent ethics scandals).
9. Mike Healy & Jennifer lles, The Establishment and Enforcement of Codes, 39
J. Bus. ETHICS 117, 122 (2002); Gordon Marino, The Latest Industry to Flounder:
Ethics, Inc., WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at A14; Vogel, supra note 8.
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extended list of potential projects: conferences, consortia, conclaves,
civility codes, and so forth. I offered the discomforting response that
no one really knew the answer to that question since no one was
evaluating the impact of such professionalism initiatives.
I then asked a series of what may have seemed awkward questions
about what exactly the committee was trying to accomplish and how
it would define success. These were not matters on which members'
discussion had focused, and there was not much of a consensus. One
primary objective was to improve lawyers' image. Drawing on recent
popular opinion polls, I questioned whether the public was likely to be
much impressed by bar professionalism initiatives unless they actually
affected the behavior that caused greatest concern-dishonesty and
greed." And I expressed polite skepticism that the lawyers most
responsible for those problems would be much affected by episodic
professionalism programs or aspirational codes."
I made a similar observation concerning the committee's other
main objective: altering uncivil behavior. Since most of what fueled
members' concerns were already violations of bar ethical rules, I
suggested that perhaps the best use of the committee's resources
would be to improve the disciplinary process rather than to develop
hortatory professionalism initiatives. And I proposed that some greater
judicial attention might usefully focus on an issue that is at the top of
the public's, if not the profession's, concern: access to justice. 2
I am not sure that these were welcome insights. But I remain
convinced that they are the ones that we should be communicating
more effectively in professionalism circles. It is a shameful irony that
the nation with the world's highest concentration of lawyers fails to
address over four-fifths of the legal needs of the poor, and prices most
ordinary problems of middle-income citizens out of the system
entirely. 3 Even in criminal cases, where indigent defendants are in
theory entitled to "effective assistance of counsel," few in practice
receive it. The crushing caseloads and ludicrously low fee awards
available for court-appointed counsel generally preclude thorough
preparation. 4 Quick pleas with no investigation are the rule, not the
10. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 3-4 (2000).
11. See id. at 91-92; see also Paul Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and
the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 707 (2002) (doubting law schools will
effect significant change within law firm culture in the short term).
12. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1789-
1808 (2001) (recounting examples of where attention is needed).
13. See id. at 1785 n. I (listing sources describing unmet legal needs of the poor).
14. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 83-85 (1999); Catherine Greene
Burnett et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective Counsel: The Past
and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 595, 626-30
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exception. In some jurisdictions, attorneys may handle as many as 900
felony matters a year, and fee caps of under a thousand dollars per
case are common.'5 That rate does not even cover overhead, and in the
few prosecutions that go to trial, kids selling sodas on the beach may
have higher hourly earnings than criminal defense counsel. 6 In this
system, it is often far better to be rich and guilty than poor and
innocent. Inadequate representation rarely results in reversal. 7 Even
in death penalty cases, individuals have been convicted when their
attorneys were asleep, on drugs, or parking their cars during key parts
of the prosecution's case.'8 Equal justice is what we inscribe on court
house doors; it does not begin to describe what goes on inside.
Although many lawyers acknowledge the problem, they generally
place responsibility for solutions anywhere and everywhere else. Bar
leaders think legislatures should allocate sufficient resources for civil
legal assistance and indigent criminal defense; judges agree, but have
declined to require it under constitutional and statutory provisions. 9
Judicial and bar leaders also believe that lawyers should provide more
pro bono assistance but, again, have declined to mandate it. Although
many lawyers have extraordinarily distinguished records of voluntary
legal service, the average for the profession as a whole is nothing to be
proud of: less than half an hour a week and under fifty cents a day.2"
An all too common view, as Oscar Wilde once put it, is that "duty is
what one expects from others .... ""
So too, although most Americans view our legal system as a
model for the rest of the world, when it comes to access to justice, our
performance leaves much to be desired. Many nations make far more
generous provisions for the have-nots, and rely on more cost-effective
(200 1); Steven J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1989
(1992); Bob Herbert, Cheap Justice, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 3, 1998, at 15.
15. See RHODE, supra note 10, at 61; Burnett et al. supra note 14, at 626-29;
Rhode, supra note 12, at 1789.
16. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 188 (2000); see also Rhode, supra
note 12, at 1789 (describing compensation rates for court-appointed defense counsel).
17. One systematic study found that over ninety-nine percent of federal claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel were unsuccessful. See Victor F. Flango & Patricia
McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L.
REV. 237, 259-60 & tbls. 12-13 (1995).
18. See Rhode, supra note 12, at 1800 (citations omitted).
19. See id. at 1801-03; Burnett et al., supra note 14, at 640.
20. See Rhode, supra note 12, at 1810 (citations omitted).
21. OsCARWiLDE,A Woman ofNo Importance, quoted in THE WIT AND HUMOR
OF OSCAR WILDE (Alvin Redman ed., 1959).
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procedures for delivering ordinary services to the haves.22 As I hope
this Conference will suggest, we could learn much from their example.
We could also profit from more searching review and cross-
cultural comparisons on issues ofprofessional accountability. Our own
bar regulatory structures are deeply flawed. In order to protect the
independence of lawyers, courts have largely monopolized authority
over the practice of law. However, most judges lack the time,
inclination, and expertise to oversee effective regulatory structures.23
Rather, they have delegated much of their authority to the organized
bar, which has obvious difficulty accommodating public interests that
often conflict with its own.
The inadequacy of bar ethical codes and enforcement processes
has emerged clearly over this past year as lawyers' roles in debacles
like Enron began to unfold.24 What is equally clear is that if our
profession cannot do a better job at getting its own house in order,
others will do it for us. A case in point involves recent federal
legislation requiring lawyers to disclose evidence of a material
violation of securities law to a company's senior executive or board of
directors, or face loss of practice privileges before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).25 In opposing the legislation, then ABA
President Robert Hirshon voiced the bar's traditional objection to
governmental intrusions on professional autonomy: lawyers were
already subject to rules of conduct and "[w]e don't need the S.E.C. to
be drafting new codes of ethics."26 But perhaps we do, if the bar
cannot, or will not, develop appropriate regulatory standards on its
own.
Dennis Archer has rightly noted in his comments here that this
new judicial legislation raises several concerns. But so too, do the
bar's current ethical rules. And part of what should engage our
concern is the ABA's repeated failures to adopt even the watered-
down discretionary disclosure provisions for client frauds
22. See Rhode, supra note 12, at 1814; see also RHODE, supra note 10, at 135-41
(describing alternatives to lawyers as a way of expanding access to justice).
23. See RHODE, supra note 10, at 145-46, 160; Benjamin H. Barton, An Institu-
tional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation-Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation:
Courts, Legislature, or the Market? (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
24. See generally Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and
Enron, STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 9 (2002) (analyzing and addressing legal profession's
role in Enron collapse).
25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784;
Rhode & Paton, supra note 24, at 12-13.
26. Jonathan D. Glater, Round Up the Usual Suspects. Lawyers, Too?, N. Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at E4 (quoting Hirshon).
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recommended by its own Ethics 2000 Commission.7 The profession's
historic unwillingness to accept adequate obligations to prevent
financial disasters points up the limitations in a regulatory process
controlled by and for lawyers. Protecting the independence of the
profession is an important value, but it is not our only value and it
needs to be tempered by public accountability.
It is these issues of accountability and access that should dominate
our professionalism debates, not the mind-numbing platitudes that the
genre typically inspires. In searching for some less pontifical way to
bring that point home, I decided that my lawyer humor collection
could use some refurbishing. Google, I was reliably informed, would
surely have something suitable. Well probably it does, but the
candidates are buried among (at latest count) some 807,000 legal
humor sites. That, of itself, raises a question worth our attention. What
have we done, or-more to the point-not done, to deserve the
outpouring of animosity on many of those sites? Answering that
question might help us think more clearly about what is lacking in our
profession and in our debates about professionalism. My hope is that
this Conference can take us one step further in that direction.
27. DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBI-
LITY AND REGULATION, 68-69 (2002); Rhode & Paton, supra note 24, at 27.
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